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I. INTRODUCTION
State buy-American statutes are among the most peculiar of
legislative responses to problems of unemployment and low levels
of economic growth in the United States. Designed to decrease un-
employment among American workers by promoting the develop-
ment of American industry, the statutes typically require that pur-
chasers of goods to be used in state-subsidized projects prefer prod-
ucts manufactured in America over those made in foreign countries,
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often regardless of price or quality.' State buy-American statutes
are presently in effect in a number of states,2 despite criticism that
they constitute devices of economic protectionism for domestic
goods and barriers to a unified United States foreign economic pol-
icy.,
Frustrated by the lack of state legislative response to these
criticisms of buy-American statutes, opponents, such as the foreign
manufacturers suffering monetary loss as a result of a buy-American
policy, have sought judicial redress by raising constitutional objec-
tions to the statutes. This effort has met with some degree of suc-
cess. In 1969, for example, a California Court of Appeals declared
the California buy-American statute an unconstitutional state in-
trusion into the field of foreign affairs, an area reserved to the fed-
eral government by the United States Constitution.4 While the Cali-
fornia court's reliance on the foreign affairs doctrine has been criti-
cized,5 the decision has generally been regarded as correct due to
other considerations. Specifically, commentators have argued that
the foreign commerce clause of the United States Constitution pre-
cludes state discrimination against foreign manufactured goods.,
The recent New Jersey Supreme Court decision in K.S.B.
1. HAw. Rzv. STAT. § 103-24 (1976), for example, provides that "[i]n all expenditures
of public money for any public work or in the purchase of materials or supplies, preference
shall be given to American products, materials and supplies."
2. See National Association of State Purchasing Officials Committee on Competition
in Governmental Purchasing, 1963 Survey on In-State Preference Practices: Domestic vs.
Foreign Purchases, reproduced in Note, State "Buy-American" Policies-One Vice, Many
Voices, 32 Gao. WASH. L. Rav. 584, 608 (1964). The states acknowledging preference for
domestic goods were Alabama, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Maine, Massa-
chusetts, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West
Virginia. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 4300-4305 (West 196); HAw. Rav. STAT. § 103-24
(1976); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 7, § 22(17) (West 1976); MONT. REV. CODEs ANN. § 82-
1920(293.10)(1947); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:33-2 (West 1955); OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 51
(West 1963); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 639 (Purdon 1962). A California state court has
declared the California statute unconstitutional. See note 4 infra and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Note, California's Buy-American Policy: Conflict with GATT and the
Constitution, 17 STA. L. Rav. 119, 137 (1964).
4. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm'rs, 276 Cal. App. 2d 221, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800
(1969). The statute provided:
The governing body of any political subdivision, municipal corporation, or district, and
any public officer or person charged with the letting of contracts for (1) the construction,
alteration, or repair of public works or (2) for the purchasing of materials for public use,
shall let such contracts only to persons who agree to use or supply only such unmanufac-
tured materials as have been produced in the United States, and only such manufac-
tured materials as have been manufactured in the United States, substantially all from
materials produced in the United States.
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 4303 (West 1966).




Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey District Water Supply
Commission raises anew the difficult issues concerning the consti-
tutionality of state buy-American statutes. The New Jersey statutes
governing public works challenged in K.S.B. provide in relevant
part:
[N]otwithstanding any inconsistent provision of any law, and unless the
head of the department, or other public officer charged with the duty by law,
shall determine it to be inconsistent with the public interest, or the cost to be
unreasonable, only domestic materials shall be acquired or used for any public
work.'
In upholding this statute, the K.S.B. court rejected a three-pronged
constitutional challenge alleging that the statute (1) violated the
"dormant" commerce clause of the United States Constitution; (2)
was preempted by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; and
(3) constituted an impermissible state intrusion into the field of
foreign affairs. This Note will consider these constitutional chal-
lenges to state buy-American statutes, concluding that such laws,
in light of both early and recent Supreme Court decisions, are in-
deed valid under the Constitution. The Note neither condemns nor
favors the policy considerations underlying state buy-American
statutes, but only suggests that those seeking removal of restrictions
on state government purchases direct their efforts to the legislative
rather than the judicial process.
II. BuY-AMEmcAN LAWS AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
A. Traditional Commerce Clause Analysis
The United States Constitution provides that Congress shall
have the power to regulate both interstate and foreign commerce.
In Gibbons v. Ogden,"0 the Supreme Court indicated that because
this power is vested exclusively in Congress, it is functional even
when dormant; the unexercised commerce power provides a barrier
to state legislation which is unduly burdensome to commerce."
Virtually all decisions defining the scope and effect of the
"dormant" commerce clause with respect to state legislation have
arisen in the interstate commerce context. The Supreme Court has
consistently invalidated state legislation that obstructs incoming
7. 75 N.J. 272, 381 A.2d 774 (1977), appeal dismissed, 98 S. Ct. 1635 (1978).
8. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:33-2, to -3 (West 1955) (governing all New Jersey public works
projects).
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
10. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
11. See, e.g., Weber v. Freed, 239 U.S. 325 (1915); Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275
(1875); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
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commerce by discriminating against out-of-state commerce. In
Welton v. Missouri" the Court struck down a state statute requiring
a license fee from dealers in out-of-state goods, stating that the
commerce power protects goods from any burden imposed by the
state because of their out-of-state origin.' 3 This protection was de-
fined further in Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison,'4 in which the
Court developed a two-pronged test to evaluate the validity of dis-
criminatory state legislation. Under the Dean Milk standard, state
laws that discriminate against interstate commerce in favor of local
enterprise are invalid unless (1) justified by legitimate local inter-
ests, (2) viewed in light of less restrictive alternatives to protect such
local interests.'5
Although the types of local interests that are legitimate for
purposes of the Dean Milk analysis have not been clearly identified,
it is certain that mere economic welfare will not justify state dis-
crimination against interstate commerce. In Baldwin v. G.A.F. See-
lig, Inc.,'" the Court indicated that although a state may regulate
to protect the health of its residents, it may not intervene simply to
"make them rich."' 7 This theme was more recently emphasized in
Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews,'8 in which the Court
struck down a Florida statute requiring milk distributors to accept
supplies from designated local producers. The Court emphasized
the intent of the Florida regulatory scheme to preserve a market for
local producers by discriminating against other producers and inter-
state commerce.'9
An analysis similar to that utilized in Dean Milk should also
be applicable in the foreign commerce context. Although several
early decisions distinguished between the foreign and interstate
commerce powers,1' regarding the former as a stronger source of
authority for congressional legislation and a greater barrier to state
legislation, the prevailing view indicates that the powers are coex-
tensive. In Pittsburg & Southern Coal Co. v. Bates2' the Court
stated that the interstate commerce power was as absolute as the
12. 91 U.S. 275 (1875).
13. Id. at 282.
14. 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
15. Id. at 354.
16. 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
17. Id. at 523.
18. 375 U.S. 361 (1964).
19. Id. at 376.
20. See, e.g., Brolan v. United States, 236 U.S. 216, 222 (1915).
21. 156 U.S. 577 (1895).
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power to regulate commerce with foreign nations. 2 This statement
indicates that a challenge to state legislation under either commerce
power would necessitate the same form of judicial analysis. Simi-
larly, in the License Cases" the Court stated that "[t]he power to
regulate commerce among the several States is granted to Congress
in the same clause, and by the same words, as the power to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and is coextensive with it."
2'
In addition, the purposes animating the commerce clause re-
quire that state laws burdening foreign commerce undergo the same
scrutiny as those burdening interstate commerce. In H.P. Hood &
Sons v. DuMond"  Justice Jackson expressed the underlying purpose
of the commerce clause as follows:
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and
every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will
have free access to every market in the Nation, that no home embargoes will
withhold his exports, and no foreign state will by customs duties or regulations
exclude them. Likewise, every consumer may look to the free competition from
every producing area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any.
Such was the vision of the Founders; such has been the doctrine of this Court
which has given it reality.2'
This two-fold purpose of the commerce clause in insuring com-
petitive markets for producers and protecting consumer interests
applies, at least in part, in the foreign commerce context. While the
authors of the Constitution may not have been particularly con-
cerned with preserving a competitive market for foreign producers,
they clearly intended to protect consumer interests by insuring that
consumers could obtain goods of the highest quality at the lowest
possible price without interference by state legislation and regula-
tion. This concern necessarily requires scrutiny of discriminatory
state laws whether or not the object of that discrimination is a
foreign product or goods produced in another state.Y Only by apply-
ing the Dean Milk analysis to invalidate state laws that discrimi-
nate against foreign commerce without protecting a legitimate local
22. Id. at 587-88.
23. 46 U.S. 590, 5 How. 504 (1847).
24. Id. at 675, 5 How. at 577.
25. 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
26. Id. at 539.
27. Courts at all levels have held discriminatory state legislation violative of the com-
merce clause. See, e.g., Hale v. Bimco Trading, Inc., 306 U.S. 375 (1939) (excessive state
inspection fee for foreign and not domestic cement); Tupman Thurlow Co. v. Moss, 252 F.
Supp. 641 (M.D. Tenn. 1966) (state statute requiring sellers of foreign meats to register and
obtain a license); City of Columbus v. McGuire, 25 Ohio Op. 2d 331, 195 N.E.2d 916 (1939)
(municipal ordinance requiring sellers of merchandise from communist nations to purchase
and post license authorizing proprietor to sell such goods).
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interest can the commerce clause adequately protect consumer in-
terests.
Applying only traditional commerce clause analysis to state
buy-American statutes, it is clear that such laws violate the com-
merce clause. Designed to protect domestic industry and thereby
promote the local economy, buy-American statutes have the in-
tended and immediate effect of securing the state government pur-
chase market for domestic producers by discriminating against for-
eign production. The Dean Milk test requirement that legitimate
local interests justify such discrimination is not satisfied because
the clear intent of buy-American statutes is to protect only the
economic interests of domestic producers. The statutes' disregard
for the relative quality of foreign goods further demonstrates that
legitimate local interests such as the health or safety of the state's
citizens are not motivating factors. Therefore the dormant com-
merce clause, as traditionally interpreted by the courts, invalidates
such state legislation.
B. The Effect of Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Traditional commerce clause analysis typically involved situa-
tions in which a state interfered with commerce through prohibition
or burdensome regulation that affected the market for an out-of-
state product. An example of such regulation would be a state tax
imposed only on goods produced out-of-state. Such a tax interferes
with incoming commerce because it forces the out-of-state producer
either to increase his price for such goods or choose not to market
his product in the state at all. The effect of buy-American statutes
is quite different. The statutes are applicable only to the state itself
after it has entered the marketplace as a purchaser. They do not
regulate incoming commerce in the same manner that a state tax
does, but rather govern the state's role as a purchaser of goods,
requiring it to purchase only domestic goods when available.
In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.28 the Supreme Court for
the first time distinguished the effect of the dormant commerce
clause on the state as a discriminatory regulator and the state as a
discriminatory purchaser. The Hughes decision involved a com-
merce clause challenge to certain Maryland statutes designed to rid
the state of abandoned automobiles ("hulks").29 The statutes pro-
vided for the collection of hulks by licensed processors who could
28. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).




claim a bounty from the state for such hulks upon proper documen-
tation as to the ownership of the hulks. The documentation require-
ments for Maryland processors differed from those for out-of-state
processors, the latter being more difficult and expensive. This dis-
crimination impeded the flow of hulks to out-of-state processors,
thus securing a major portion of the Maryland bounty for local
processors. 1 Writing for the Court, Justice Powell initially ad-
dressed the traditional commerce clause cases in which state legisla-
tion interfered with the natural functioning of the interstate market
through prohibition or burdensome regulation of private enter-
prise.32 Distinguishing these cases from the situation in which the
state itself entered the market as a potential purchaser of an article
of interstate commerce, the Court upheld the challenged statutory
scheme, stating that "[n]othing in the purposes animating the
Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional
action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to
favor its own citizens over others."
33
The Court's unique departure from traditional commerce
clause analysis in Hughes is subject to varied interpretations. The
precise circumstances under which a state, after entering the mar-
ketplace as a purchaser, may discriminate against goods produced
out-of-state are uncertain. At least two interpretations, however,
have been formulated to explain the Court's decision that states
may be exempt from commerce clause review under certain circum-
stances.
(1) The States as Subsidizers of Social Welfare Programs
The most restrictive interpretation of the Hughes decision pro-
poses that the commerce clause does not apply to discriminatory
state action that occurs in the context of state subsidization of social
welfare programs, even if such programs affect the flow of commerce
30. Maryland processors needed only to submit an indemnification agreement executed
by the transferor of the hulk in favor of the processor to show that the processor was protected
against potential conversion claims by third parties arising from the destruction of a hulk.
Out-of-state processors were not permitted to submit such agreements, but were required to
show a certificate of title, a police certificate vesting title, or a bill of sale from a police
auction. 426 U.S. at 800-01.
31. Alexandria Scrap Corporation submitted an affidavit showing a 31.8% decline in
the receipt of bounty-eligible hulks from Maryland sources at a time when receipts increased
from other states. Id. at 801 n.11.
32. Id. at 806.
33. Id. at 810 (footnotes omitted). Justice Powell noted that his reference to the absence
of congressional action implied no view as to whether Congress could prohibit the selective
participation of a state in the market. Id. at 810 n.19.
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from outside the state. The theory underlying this conclusion ex-
cludes, by definition, social welfare programs from the constrictions
of the dormant commerce clause. Accordingly, a state may legiti-
mately reserve social welfare benefits to its own citizens and may
discriminate with regard to expenditures made pursuant to such
programs. The concurring opinion of Justice Stevens in Hughes es-
pouses this analysis,34 emphasizing that the commerce involved in
the Hughes case would not have existed but for a Maryland subsidy
program.15 Legislation that discriminates against out-of-state pro-
cessors by effectively denying to them the right to receive Maryland
subsidization"6 is no more invalid than Maryland's refusal to pay,
for example, unemployment benefits to residents of other states.
If the Hughes decision does stand for the proposition that the
states may avoid commerce clause restrictions only when providing
for social welfare programs, state buy-American statutes must still
overcome a strong commerce clause challenge. Although all state
expenditures pursuant to buy-American laws are for social welfare
purposes since they are for government use, the discrimination exer-
cised is in favor of all United States citizens, not just those of the
particular state. The analogy to the typical state social welfare ex-
penditures or to the Maryland subsidy in Hughes is no longer valid;
state buy-American statutes may not be justified by the states' right
to favor their own citizens in providing social welfare benefits. The
crucial question then becomes whether a state may exercise its right
to discriminate by making social welfare expenditures in favor of all
United States citizens, at the expense of foreign commerce. The
answer is uncertain, but courts should find persuasive the argument
that if a state may legislate parochially with regard to the state, it
should also be able to do so in favor of the nation.37 If the commerce
clause, as indicated by Hughes, allows a state to discriminate
against both interstate and foreign commerce while dispensing so-
cial welfare benefits for its own citizens, it seems logical that the
commerce clause would allow the state to discriminate against ei-
ther form of commerce individually. Under this interpretation, buy-
American statutes, which confer social welfare benefits on all
United States citizens while discriminating against foreign trade,
are not in violation of the commerce clause.
34. Id. at 814.
35. Id. at 815.
36. Id. at 815-16.
37. The K.S.B. court adopted this approach. See 75 N.J. at 298, 381 A.2d at 787.
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(2) The State as a Purchaser
The Hughes decision may be read more broadly to hold that a
state's status as a purchaser rather than a regulator renders com-
merce clause restrictions on state action inapplicable. The theory
underlying such a doctrine assumes that a state's discriminatory
purchasing practices do not frustrate the purposes of the commerce
clause in the same manner as state legislation prohibiting or bur-
dening the sale of foreign goods. Thus the state, when acting as a
purchaser, is by definition exempted from commerce clause restric-
tions and may discriminate with respect to its purchases as any
individual purchaser may do. Justice Powell's analysis in the
Hughes decision supports this interpretation. Quoting Justice Jack-
son's language in H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond,38 Justice Powell
identified the commerce clause purposes of insuring free access for
any producer to any market and protecting consumer interests by
prohibiting exclusion of out-of-state products by discriminatory
state regulation." In light of these purposes, Justice Powell con-
cluded that state action as a discriminatory purchaser does not
frustrate the objectives of the commerce clause because the state
has not denied an out-of-state product access to the local market,
nor has the state burdened the out-of-state product with a discrimi-
natory tax or regulation."
The state as a purchaser interpretation of Hughes finds support
in American Yearbook Co. v. Askew,41 a 1972 district court decision
summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court. In upholding a Florida
statute requiring all state government printing to be done by Florida
printers, the district court declared that while state trade regula-
tions are clearly subject to commerce clause restrictions, statutes
that merely specify the conditions of state purchases are not. 2
(3) Conclusion
Only the New Jersey Supreme Court has addressed the com-
merce clause challenge to state buy-American statutes. 3 Although
the K.S.B. decision does not discuss the possible alternative inter-
pretations of Hughes, it implicitly adopts the "state as a purchaser"
analysis proposed above and thus relies on the Hughes decision to
38. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
39. 426 U.S. at 808.
40. Id. at 809-10.
41. 339 F. Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla. 1972), summarily aff'd, 409 U.S. 904 (1972).
42. Id. at 725.
43. 75 N.J. at 293-302, 381 A.2d at 784-89.
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uphold the New Jersey buy-American statute." This appears to be
the better view of Hughes. The majority's analysis in Hughes, as
expressed by Justice Powell, is not dependent on the factor of state
social welfare expenditures,45 but rather seeks to determine whether
the state was discriminating justifiably as a purchaser or improperly
as a regulator attempting to insulate a local market. This defini-
tional approach to the commerce clause is not without logic. Consid-
ering the purposes animating the commerce clause," it is reasonable
to conclude that the Framers were concerned only with the power
to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. State regulatory pow-
ers present the greatest potential for abuse in undermining competi-
tive markets to the detriment of consumer interests. Although state
action as a purchaser does have an indirect effect on commerce, it
does not possess the potential to commit the abuses that the com-
merce clause seeks to prevent." In addition, state action as a pur-
chaser merely represents the collective exercise of the right to dis-
criminate in the purchase of goods possessed by each individual
within a state. Thus, the incidental effect on commerce is only that
which would result if all persons within a state chose individually
to discriminate in favor of state or American products.
In sum, it is submitted that this broad interpretation of Hughes
is correct, leaving little question that state buy-American statutes
would survive a commerce clause challenge. Since the statutes only
govern the state as a purchaser of products for state government use,
they do not frustrate the underlying purpose of the commerce clause
by inhibiting the free flow of foreign commerce into the state
through burdensome regulation; access to the market in a buy-
American state remains available to foreign products and no bur-
densome tax or regulation is placed on foreign products. Because
Hughes excludes the state as a purchaser from traditional commerce
clause restrictions, buy-American statutes represent only the mani-
festation of a state's right to discriminate against foreign goods in
making its own purchases.
44. Id. at 300, 381 A.2d at 788.
45. Justice Powell indicated that his analysis was not dependent on the existence of
state subsidization, noting that the Court
would hesitate to hold that the Commerce Clause forbids state action reducing or elimi-
nating a flow of commerce dependent for its existence upon state subsidy instead of
private market forces. Because the record contains no details of the hulk market prior
to the bounty scheme, however, this issue is not clearly presented.
426 U.S. at 809 n.18.
46. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
47. See text accompanying notes 34-42 supra.
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III. BUY-AMERICAN LAWS AND THE PREEMPTION DOCTRIE: THE
EmcT OF GATT"
The United States Constitution provides for the supremacy of
legitimate federal enactments over conflicting state law.49 This su-
premacy is accorded not only to federal legislative action, but also
to international agreements to which the United States is a party.
In United States v. Pink0 the Supreme Court held that a state law
must yield if it is inconsistent with, or impairs the policy or provi-
sions of, a treaty or international agreement.5 1
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)12 argua-
bly has preempted state buy-American laws in Part II, Article III,
paragraph 4, which provides:
The products of the territory of a contracting party imported into the territory
of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable
than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws,
regulations and requirements affecting their international sale, offering for
sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.1
3
State buy-American laws plainly violate this provision by re-
quiring that only domestic materials be purchased or used for any
public program paid for by the state. However, GATT contains two
potential exemptions to the general provisions of paragraph 4. Part
II, Article II, paragraph 8(a) provides that the "provisions of this
article shall not apply to laws, regulations or requirements govern-
ing the procurement by governmental agencies of products pur-
chased for governmental purposes and not with a view to commer-
cial resale or with a view to use in the production of goods for
commercial sale."
54
48. This discussion of GAT and its possible preemption of state buy-American stat-
utes is intended only as a general overview. For a more complete discussion, see Note, supra
note 3, at 126-32.
49. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 provides in relevant part that "[tihis Constitution, and
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
made, . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land. . . ." For an example of the supremacy
of United States treaties over state law, see Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961)(treaty
granting inheritance rights to Yugoslavian citizens in the United States superseded Oregon
statute conditioning inheritance rights of aliens on reciprocal rights of United States citizens
to inherit in alien's home country).
50. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
51. Id. at 230-31.
52. October 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5-6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, vol. I, as amended by Second
Protocol of Rectifications to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, September 14,
1948, 62 Stat. 3671, T.I.A.S. No. 1888; Protocol Modifying Part II and Article XXVI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, September 14, 1948, 62 Stat. 3679, T.I.A.S. No.
1890.
53. 62 Stat. at 3681 (emphasis added).
54. Id. (emphasis added).
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Although some dispute exists concerning whether the govern-
mental use exemption applies only to the federal goverment or to
both the federal and state governments, the generally accepted view
includes state governments within the exemption.5 The K.S.B.
court adopted this position in considering a preemption challenge
to the New Jersey buy-American statutes, utilizing the exemption
to hold that the statutes were not preempted by GATT." Thus, to
the extent that a buy-American law regulates government pur-
chases for purposes other than commercial resale, GATT is not
preemptive-indeed it was apparently drafted with such legislation
in mind.
Another potential exemption from the provisions of GATT is
contained in section I of the Protocol of Provisional Application of
GATT, which provides that the signatory governments undertake to
apply "Part H of the Agreement to the fullest extent not inconsist-
ent with existing legislation.5 7 Although there is some question
whether existing state legislation was intended to be included
within this exemption, the courts have ignored this provision in
considering preemption challenges to buy-American statutes, many
of which were enacted prior to GATT. In Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton
v. Superior Court" a California court held GATT preemptive of the
California buy-American law because the state had made purchases
for the purpose of commercial resale, ignoring the fact that the
California statute was enacted prior to GAIT.59 In the K.S.B. deci-
sion, the court went to great lengths to avoid the "commercial re-
sale" exception to the governmental use exemption, despite the fact
that a much easier route may have been available-the existing
legislation exemption."
In sum, the GATT preemption challenge to state buy-American
laws should fail, at least to the extent that such laws are concerned
with the regulation of government purchases that are not intended
for commercial resale. In addition, state buy-American statutes that
55. There is no language in GATT to indicate that "governmental" refers only to the
federal government. One writer has also suggested that certain provisions of GATT may
indicate that the treaty was intended to recognize the existence of political subdivisions, thus
lending support to the application of the governmental use exemption to state governments.
See Note, supra note 2, at 592. Part I, Article XXIV, paragraph 6 provides that "[e]ach
contracting party shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to it to assure
observance of the provisions of this Agreement by the regional and local governments and
authorities within its territory." 61 Stat. pt. 5, at 67-68.
56. 75 N.J. at 281, 381 A.2d at 778.
57. 61 Stat. pt. 6, at 2051 (emphasis added).
58. 208 Cal. App. 2d 803, 25 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1962).
59. Id. at 819, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
60. 75 N.J. at 281-89, 381 A.2d at 778-82.
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existed prior to the enactment of GATT may be exempt from its
provisions regardless of the purposes of the government purchases.
IV. BUY-AMERICAN LAWS AND THE FEDERAL POWER OVER FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
The conduct of international affairs is generally considered to
require a "broad national authority."'" In Perez v. Brownwell2 Jus-
tice Frankfurter recognized that the federal government
must be able not only to deal affirmatively with foreign nations, as it does
through the maintenance of diplomatic relations with them and the protection
of American citizens sojourning within their territories. It must also be able
to reduce to a minimum the frictions that are unavoidable in a world of sover-
eigns sensitive in matters touching their dignity and interests.3
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the
power to formulate and conduct United States foreign policy is
vested in the federal government." This is an implicit power, not
dependent on an express constitutional delegation of author-
ity-"[t]he States that joined together to form a single Nation and
to create, through the Constitution, a Federal Government to con-
duct the affairs of that Nation must be held to have granted that
Government the powers indispensible to its functioning effectively
in the company of sovereign nations."'5
The federal power over the conduct of foreign affairs is exclu-
sive." The Constitution prohibits states from entering into any
agreement or compact with a foreign nation and from engaging in
war unless actually invaded.'7 Furthermore, this federal power may
not be curtailed or interfered with by any state. As demonstrated
in United States v. Pink, a state law must yield if inconsistent with
the provisions of a treaty or agreement entered into by the federal
government."
Although a state may not enter into an international agreement
61. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 68 (1941).
62. 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
63. Id. at 57.
64. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52
(1941); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
65. 356 U.S. at 57.
66. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942).
67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 provides in relevant part:
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; ....
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, .... enter into any Agreement or
Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually
invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.
68. 315 U.S. at 230-31.
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nor pass laws in conflict with federal foreign policy, the effect of the
unexercised federal foreign affairs power as a barrier to state legisla-
tion raises a number of questions. For example, may states enact
legislation that has an incidental or indirect effect on foreign
affairs? If so, how great an effect may such legislation have before
it is regarded as an unconstitutional intrusion into the field of for-
eign affairs reserved to the federal government? Finally, do state
buy-American statutes unconstitutionally intrude into that exclu-
sively federal domain?
A. The Early Decisions
Early Supreme Court decisions indicated that the states were
not completely barred from enacting legislation that had an effect
on foreign affairs. In Hines v. Davidowitz9 the Court considered a
challenge to the 1939 Pennsylvania alien registration act based on
the theory that the Federal Alien Registration Act superseded and
invalidated the Pennsylvania act. Although striking down the
Pennsylvania legislation on the ground that concurrent state power
in the field of foreign affairs is restricted to the narrowest of limits,"
the Court did note that state power, at least in the area of alien
registration, is not controverted except in the presence of federal
laws. 7' In United States v. Pink the United States challenged a New
York court decision concerning title to the assets of an American
branch of a Russian insurance company nationalized by the Soviet
Union. Because an agreement between the United States and the
Soviet Union had already determined title to these assets, the Su-
preme Court reversed the lower decision. In doing so, however, the
Court stated that treaties with foreign nations would not be con-
strued so as to derogate from the authority and jurisdiction of the
states unless clearly necessary in order to effectuate national pol-
icy. 72
These early Supreme Court decisions focused on the impact of
state action on an announced policy of the United States with re-
spect to foreign affairs-an analysis essentially concerned with the
preemption of state action by federal legislation. The decisions did
not address, however, the effect of the unexercised federal foreign
affairs power on state action. Justice Douglas' opinion in Clark v.
Allen73 best illustrates the Court's limited concern in reviewing al-
69. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
70. Id. at 68.
71. Id. at 66.
72. 315 U.S. at 230.
73. 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
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leged state intrusion into the realm of foreign affairs. In Clark the
Court considered a challenge to a provision of the 1942 California
Probate Code that conditioned the right of nonresident aliens to
acquire personal property on the existence of reciprocal rights for
American citizens to acquire property in the nations of which such
aliens were citizens. Petitioner argued that the provision intruded
into the realm of foreign affairs, an area exclusively reserved by the
Constitution to the federal government.74 In upholding the state
statute the Court dismissed the argument as "farfetched."75 Justice
Douglas acknowledged that local law may be invalidated by an
overriding federal policy, such as a treaty that provides for different
or conflicting arrangements, but pointed out that no such treaty
existed in Clark. This analysis clearly reflected the Court's belief
that the unexercised federal foreign affairs power provides no barrier
to state legislation that might affect relations between the United
States and other nations.
B. The Effect of Zschernig v. Miller
In Zschernig v. Miller7 the Supreme Court formulated a new
constitutional doctrine, holding that state legislative action may
unconstitutionally intrude into United States foreign policy even in
the absence of a treaty or other federal action. Zschernig involved a
challenge to an Oregon inheritance statute77 that permitted nonresi-
dent aliens to inherit from estates in Oregon only upon proof of (1)
a reciprocal right of United States citizens to take property on the
same terms as a citizen or inhabitant of the foreign nation; (2) the
right of United States citizens to receive payments in the United
States from estates in the foreign nation; and (3) the right of foreign
heirs to receive the proceeds of the Oregon estate without confisca-
tion by the foreign government. 7 The Court held that the applica-
tion of the Oregon statute produced an impermissible intrusion into
the field of foreign affairs. Justice Douglas' majority opinion at-
tempted to distinguish his earlier opinion in Clark, stating that the
statute involved in Clark required only a "routine reading" of for-
eign law.7' In contrast, the Oregon statute in Zschernig, according
to Douglas, required "minute inquiries" into the actual administra-
tion of foreign law and the credibility of foreign diplomatic state-
74. Id. at 517.
75. Id. at 516-17.
76. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
77. OR. REv. STAT. § 111.070 (1957)(repealed 1969).
78. For the precise language of the statute, see 389 U.S. at 430 n.1.
79. Id. at 433.
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ments concerning inheritance rights in other nations." Utilizing an
analysis strikingly similar to that employed in the early commerce
clause decisions, Douglas found that the Oregon statute constituted
a level of state involvement in foreign affairs and international rela-
tions that had more than an "incidental or indirect" effect in foreign
nations.81 In the Court's opinion, judicial application of the statute
would adversely affect the power of the federal government to deal
with foreign policy problems. Justice Douglas expressed particular
concern with certain anti-communist statements made by the Ore-
gon courts in applying the statute, recognizing the potential for
"disruption or embarrassment.""
Justice Stewart, concurring in the decision, disapproved of the
Oregon statute on its face. He expressed concern that such a statute
would invariably lead to probate court evaluation of the policies of
foreign nations.1 Justice Harlan, concurring only in the result, and
Justice White, dissenting, rejected the theory that the unexercised
foreign affairs power could invalidate state legislation, arguing that
absent a treaty or express constitutional provision, the federal power
to conduct foreign policy provides no barrier to state legislationA
The Zschernig decision's application to state buy-American
laws has produced varying results. In Bethlehem Steel Corp. v.
Board of Commissoners of the Department of Water and Power5 a
California Court of Appeals relied on a broad interpretation of the
Zschernig decision in striking down the California buy-American
statute. Without explanation, the court held that the statute had a
direct impact on United States foreign affairs and was therefore
unconstitutional under Zschernig. In contrast, the K.S.B. court
took a narrower view of the Zschernig decision and upheld the New
Jersey buy-American statute. The K.S.B. court analyzed those fac-
tors that disturbed Justice Douglas in evaluating the Oregon inheri-
tance statute in Zschernig, concluding that the New Jersey statute
required no inquiry into the policies of other nations, but instead
applied to all foreign nations, regardless of their policies." The court
rejected the contention that the Zschernig doctrine prohibited state
legislation having any effect on foreign affairs and thus found no
authority for striking down the New Jersey buy-American statute
80. Id. at 435.
81. Id. at 434.
82. Id. at 437 & n.8.
83. Id. at 442.
84. Id. at 458-62.
85. 276 Cal. App. 2d 221, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1969).
86. 75 N.J. at 291, 381 A.2d at 783.
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as an impermissible state intrusion into the field of foreign affairs.87
K.S.B.'s narrow application of the Zschernig doctrine has re-
ceived wider acceptance. For example, in Goldstein v. Cox" the
district court for the Southern District of New York upheld a state
statute that conditioned the distribution of property from an estate
to a nonresident alien upon a showing that the recipient would
ultimately have the benefit of such property without confiscation by
the foreign government involved. The court refused to invalidate the
New York statute in the absence of a showing that the statute was
applied in a manner that would jeopardize relations with a particu-
lar nation. Specifically, the court sought evidence of any
"animadversions" toward a foreign nation resulting from a judicial
application of the statute." Finding none, the court refused to de-
clare the statute an unconstitutional intrusion into the field of for-
eign affairs.
Because of the unique purposes for which buy-American stat-
utes are employed, the application of Zschernig in determining
whether such laws constitute an impermissible state intrusion in the
field of foreign affairs is of little use. Although the decision does
provide limited authority for concluding that the state buy-
American statutes are unconstitutional, Zschernig should not be
applied in this area. The concerns of Justice Douglas that resulted
in the Zschernig decision are not present in the buy-American field.
First, the statutes do not require American courts or other govern-
mental institutions to evaluate the laws and policies of other na-
tions. Buy-American statutes discriminate against all foreign na-
tions whether or not such nations also have buy-national acts or
make expenditures under an implicit buy-national policy. Thus
buy-American statutes do not threaten to jeopardize relations with
particular foreign nations.
Second, buy-American statutes do not require American courts
to examine the truthfulness of representations made by spokesmen
for other nations. Again, because the statutes apply to all foreign
nations, they provide no opportunity for such inquiries. In addition,
state buy-American statutes do not present the opportunity for
American courts or government officials to make derogatory re-
marks concerning the policies of foreign nations.
The concerns of the Supreme Court in Zschernig might be more
applicable if a buy-American statute conditioned the use of foreign
87. Id. at 293, 381 A.2d at 784.
88. 299 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
89. Id. at 1393.
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goods on the nondiscrimination of that foreign nation with regard
to the purchase of American goods. In such a situation, American
courts would be required to inquire into the laws and policies of
other nations, and the statutes might perform a more coercive func-
tion on the policies of other nations. The states would in effect be
stating the conditions under which a foreign nation could expect its
products to receive nondiscriminatory treatment in the United
States. Such discretion would certainly merit evaluation as a possi-
ble state intrusion into the field of foreign affairs. In fact, however,
state buy-American statutes do not have this discriminatory anti-
foreign effect, but rather are strictly pro-American in effect. Thus,
the Zschernig concerns should not apply.
Any attempt to "fill out" the Zschernig doctrine that the unex-
ercised foreign affairs power acts as a barrier to state legislation
requires great speculation. It is uncertain what types of state legisla-
tion constitute a direct and impermissible effect on foreign affairs
in the absence of further case law on the subject. Of particular
interest in the buy-American area, however, is the question whether
the federal government can validate otherwise unconstitutional
state legislation by consent to such legislation. Specifically, has the
federal government impliedly consented to state buy-American
statutes by providing specific exemptions for them in GATT?
C. Federal Consent to State Law
As noted previously, the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade expressly exempts state buy-American laws from its restric-
tions. 0 Within the context of GATT, this provision may be inter-
preted as implicit federal consent to, or at least acquiescence in,
state law that provides for state government discrimination against
foreign goods when making purchases for government use. The court
in Bethlehem Steel expressly refused to discuss this arguable con-
sent in its application of the Zschernig doctrine to buy-American
statutes." The K.S.B. court, on the other hand, stated that the
exemption indicates that the federal government has not foreclosed
state action that does not have a significant and direct effect on
foreign affairs . 2 In light of the uncertain scope of the Zschernig
doctrine and its applicaton in the buy-American area, an analysis
of the effect of federal consent to state action challenged under the
unexercised foreign affairs power is important in considering the
90. See notes 48-60 supra and accompanying text.
91. 276 Cal. App. 2d at 227 n.9, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 804 n.9.
92. 75 N.J. at 302, 381 A.2d at 789.
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constitutionality of state buy-American statutes. A possible analogy
can first be drawn to the unexercised foreign commerce power.
(1) Federal Consent and the Unexercised Commerce Power
In Cooley v. Board of Wardens93 the Supreme Court stated that
if the United States Constitution prohibited the states from enact-
ing legislation regulating interstate commerce, Congress could not
in any manner regrant or reconvey that power to the states. 4 Subse-
quent cases, however, refute this contention. In Leisy v. Hardin"5 the
Court applied a dormant commerce clause analysis to invalidate an
Iowa law that prohibited the sale of intoxicating liquors as applied
to beer brewed in Illinois and offered for sale in its original package
in Iowa. In reaching this decision, however, the Court stated that
since the exchange of commodities such as beer was interstate com-
merce and thus demanded uniform regulation by the federal govern-
ment, the state had no power to interfere in the absence of congres-
sional permission." The Court expressly recognized the possibility
that Congress might grant to the states the power to regulate com-
merce in certain areas in Prudential Insurance Corp. v. Benjamin."
In that case the Court considered a New Jersey corporation's chal-
lenge to a three percent tax on insurance premiums received from
business done in South Carolina. Because no similar tax was re-
quired of South Carolina corporations, the Court assumed that the
tax was discriminatory and thus in violation of the dormant com-
merce clause. The Court nonetheless held that the McCarrie Act of
1945 validated the tax by providing that no act of Congress be
construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by
any state for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or
which imposed a fee or tax upon such business. 8 Thus the Court
held that congressional consent prevailed over dormant commerce
clause considerations.
(2) Federal Consent in the Interjurisdictional Compact Context
The concept of federal consent to state action otherwise barred
by constitutional provisions also arises in the interjurisdictional
compact context. The Constitution provides that the states may
enter into interjurisdictional compacts only with the consent of
93. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
94. Id. at 317.
95. 135 U.S. 100 (1890).
96. Id. at 125.
97. 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
98. Id. at 429-31.
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Congress.99 In the event of such consent, however, a state may enter
into agreement with other states or compacts with foreign nations.
The problem of defining "congressional consent" has generally aris-
en in the interstate compact context."' In Virginia v. Tennessee'°'
the Supreme Court upheld an agreement which established a
boundary line between Virginia and Tennessee, concluding that
Congress had consented to the agreement by exercising jurisdiction
over the area in question according to the terms of the agreement
for an extended period of time without question or dispute. °0 The
Court required no express congressional approval of the agreement
and stated that consent to state action is to be given effect whether
the consent precedes the action or is given after an agreement is
consummated.'03
(3) Federal Consent and the Preemption of State Law Regulating
Aliens
In DeCanas v. Bica'° the Supreme Court considered a chal-
lenge to a California statute' 5 that prohibited employers from know-
ingly employing aliens not entitled to lawful residence in the United
States. The statute was challenged on the ground that the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act (INA)"'° preempted such state action. In
upholding the California statute, the Court distinguished Hines v.
Davidowitz'°7 and Pennsylvania v. Nelson,' two cases striking
down state regulation of aliens on preemption grounds. The Court
placed particular emphasis on the fact that in DeCanas there was
evidence that "Congress sanctioned concurrent state legislation on
the subject covered by the challenged state law."'' 9 The evidence
referred to was an INA provision that stated that the INA was
intended to "supplement state action" and that compliance with
the INA would not excuse compliance with appropriate state law
and regulation."0
99. See note 67 supra.
100. See, e.g., Wharton v. Wise, 153 U.S. 155 (1894); Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S.
503 (1893).
101. 148 U.S. 503 (1893).
102. Id. at 522.
103. Id. at 525.
104. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
105. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805 (West Supp. 1978).
106. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1976).
107. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
108. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
109. 424 U.S. at 363.




Considering the breadth of the federal consent concept, future
courts applying the Zschernig doctrine should examine the possibil-
ity that federal consent may validate state laws that otherwise im-
permissibly affect foreign affairs. The heavy use of commerce clause
language in Zschernig lends itself to the analogy to commerce clause
decisions and thus to the applicability of the federal consent con-
cept. Indeed, the dormant commerce clause decisions and the for-
eign affairs power are based on similar considerations-the need for
national uniformity in matters which significantly affect the nation
as a whole.
Moreover, the Constitution expressly contemplates the valida-
tion of state action by federal consent in certain areas concerned
with foreign affairs. Although states are prohibited from entering
into agreements with foreign nations, Congress may validate such
action by express or implied consent."' There is no constitutional
justification for allowing such consent with regard to state treaty
making, while not allowing such consent with regard to the implied
prohibitions on state action supplied by the Zschernig doctrine.
Thus, assuming that the federal government has expressed consent
to state buy-American laws in the GATT exemptions, a strong argu-
ment arises that the federal foreign affairs power does not affect the
validity of such statutes.
V. CONCLUSION
It is submitted that state buy-American statutes neither con-
flict with existing federal law nor violate the provisions of the
United States Constitution. Thus foreign manufacturers who have
been the subject of the discriminatory effect of state buy-American
statutes, and opponents of the economic protectionism fostered by
such laws, should not find judicial relief. The K.S.B. decision por-
tends the judicial reaction to constitutional challenges to such legis-
lation, especially in the state courts. Moreover the Supreme Court
has refused to hear an appeal of the K.S.B. decision," 2 ending judi-
cial alternatives to those seeking to overturn the New Jersey buy-
American statute.
Assuming that the state legislatures that have enacted buy-
American laws will not voluntarily repeal them, what are the alter-
natives available to the opponents of such laws? Congressional legis-
111. See text accompanying notes 99-103 supra.




lation prohibiting state government discrimination against foreign
products presents one possible solution. Such legislation is clearly
authorized by the constitutional grant to Congress of the power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations. , 3 The validity of such legis-
lation, however, is questionable in light of the Supreme Court's
decision in National League of Cities v. Usery,"4 in which the Court
invalidated the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards
Act" that applied minimum wage and maximum hour provisions
to the state government employees. The Court stated that Congress
could not, under the commerce power, make wage and hour provi-
sions with regard to functions and services which state governments
have traditionally afforded their citizens and which are matters
essential to the separate and independent existence of the states.",
While the constitutional theory underlying such a holding is un-
clear,'17 the Usery prohibitions may well be applicable to a congres-
sional attempt to regulate the policy decisions underlying state gov-
ernment purchases by abolishing state buy-American statutes.
Alternatively, and in avoidance of the Usery problems, congres-
sional refusal to exempt state government legislation from the re-
strictions of future international trade agreements could result in
the preemption of state buy-American laws to the extent that they
violate such agreements. Certainly GATT, absent the governmental
use and existing legislation exemptions, would preclude discrimina-
tory state government purchases under many circumstances.' 8
Neither of these legislative alternatives seems probable. Past
federal sanction of state buy-American statutes, as well as the en-
acting of the federal Buy-American Act"9 indicate legislative sup-
port for such laws. This support may well increase in light of current
economic instability and balance-of-trade deficits. Furthermore,
from a strictly political viewpoint, one can easily imagine the legis-
113. See text accompanying notes 9-11 supra.
114. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
115. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976).
116. 426 U.S. at 855.
117. For a discussion of possible theories, see Tribe, Unraveling National League of
Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90
HARv. L. REV. 1065 (1977).
118. See notes 48-60 supra and accompanying text.
119. 41 U.S.C. §§ loa-10d (1976). The impact of the Federal Buy-American Act is
demonstrated by the Title of Resolution to the Oklahoma buy-American statute. It reads:
"[a] 'Buy American' Resolution; taking cognizance of the desirability of purchasing products
and supplies produced in the United States, and of Federal legislation encouraging such
practices; and directing state agencies to adhere to that practice with certain exceptions."
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 51 (West 1963)(emphasis added).
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lative reluctance to repeal legislation protecting domestic goods
from foreign competitors. In sum, state buy-American statutes are
apparently here to stay.
GEORGE C. LAMB III

